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1. Introduction 
1.1 The tax forum 
The Australian Government has announced that a Tax Forum will be held in October.  The 
Treasurer’s introduction to a Discussion Paper for the Forum points out that (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2011, p. vi): 
The Tax Forum is an opportunity to hear from all parts of the Australian community about the 
future of our tax and transfer system. 
That paper indicates that the government’s approach to tax reform is built around: 
1. Reform to make the economy stronger; 
2. Reform to make the tax system fairer; 
3. Reform to make the tax system simpler. 
Session 5 of the Tax Forum is suggested as being concerned with Environmental and Social 
Taxes, the Discussion paper noting that (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011, p, 29): 
In some circumstances, specific taxes ... can be used to improve market or social outcomes by 
addressing spillover costs through appropriate price signalling.  User charging can also play a 
complementary role to signal underlying resource costs of publicly-provided goods and 
services. 
Road transport is mentioned as an example of an area where this approach may be relevant, The 
Discussion Paper reminding readers that (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011, p, 29): 
The AFTS review recommended that governments should consider the introduction of variable 
congestion pricing.  Beyond that, the review commented that new technologies may further 
enable wider application of road pricing if proven cost-effective. 
With respect to Environmental and Social taxes, the Discussion paper invites possible 
discussion on three areas at the Tax Forum (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011, p. 31): 
• Should Australia consider ways to more closely link road charging to the impact users 
have on the condition and upkeep of roads? 
• Is there a case to more closely link road charging to the impact users have on the level 
of congestion on particular roads? 
• Are there aspects of other tax arrangements that create unintended incentives for 
adverse environmental outcomes, or ways in which governments could use specific 
taxes to ensure that people take appropriate account of environmental impacts in their 
decision making? 
The present paper takes the opportunity to contribute to this discussion. 
1.2 Australia’s future tax system (AFTS) 
In May 2010, the Commonwealth Government released the report of the AFTS review 
(sometimes known as the Henry Tax Review).  That review reported1
Current road tax arrangements will not meet Australia's future transport challenges. Poorly 
functioning road networks harm the amenity, sustainability, liveability and productivity of 
society. Moving from indiscriminate taxes to efficient prices would allow Australia to leverage 
the value of its existing transport infrastructure. Less congested roads, shorter travel times and 
: 
                                                          
1 http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/FinalReport.aspx?doc=html/publications/papers/Final_Report_Part_1/chapter_8.htm 
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investment in road infrastructure that addresses user demand would provide a foundation for 
further productivity growth, improved living standards and more sustainable cities. 
The AFTS review suggested location-specific congestion charges, removal of cross-subsidies in 
heavy vehicle charging for road use and regulatory solutions to negative spillovers not currently 
amenable to pricing, in return for lower taxes on road use (excise) and some other reforms of 
current road user charges.  It argued that investment in roads should be guided by the results of 
comprehensive and transparent cost benefit analyses.  The review expected substantial benefits 
to flow from these reforms. 
1.3 COAG road reform plan (CRRP) 
Following a Productivity Commission 2006 inquiry into road and rail freight infrastructure 
pricing (Productivity Commission 2006), the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 
initiated a Road Reform Plan (CRRP), to develop and evaluate options for heavy vehicle pricing 
reform and road funding and expenditure reform.    
CRRP has recently produced a draft report evaluating pricing and funding options (CRRP 
2011), in which it proposes a staged move to charging heavy vehicles for their road use based 
on measures of the static mass of the vehicle, the actual distance travelled and its location on the 
road network (mass/distance/location or MDL charging).  It is noteworthy that the technology 
required to implement MDL charging could be extended from the heavy vehicle fleet to all 
vehicles should a comprehensive road pricing reform program be pursued, as proposed in the 
present paper.  
The CRRP process is very narrow in its focus.  It excludes light vehicles (which constitute the 
majority of the Australian vehicle fleet and ignores all external costs other than road damage.  It 
would be remarkable if such a narrowly based terms of reference produced a significant 
enhancement in the efficiency of the Australian land transport task!  
1.4 This paper 
Against the background of the three reports noted above, this paper looks at the external costs of 
road use in Australia and suggests it is time to commence a more ambitious road pricing reform 
program.  Some illustrative calculations of externality charges are presented, using an 
optimisation model developed by Dr Ian Parry from Resources for the Future.  A version of Dr 
Parry’s model was used by Clarke and Prentice (2009) in providing advice to the Henry Tax 
Review2
2. External costs of road use 
.   
Economic theory recognises that, in a competitive market economy, the existence of external 
costs and benefits creates a situation where the market decisions of individual consumers and 
producers no longer add up to an efficient outcome for society3.  Market prices do not reflect 
these externalities and there will be too much (negative externality) or too little (positive 
externality) production of the good or service that causes the externality.   In general, market 
pricing on the basis of social costs, not private (or internal) costs, is a requisite for efficient 
resource allocation4
 
.   
                                                          
2 They used the model as set out in Parry and Small (2005). 
3 External costs describe a situation where there are uncompensated costs of transactions that accrue to third parties, who did not 
agree to whatever caused these costs (conversely for external benefits).   
4 The idea of imposing a tax or charge to correct market prices for negative externalities has a long history in economics, usually 
associated with the work of Pigou (1920) (hence the term Pigovian tax). 
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In land transport, most discussion of external costs has focused on the external costs of road use.  
The typical external costs that are usually considered in this context are: 
• congestion 
• greenhouse gas emissions 
• local air pollution 
• noise pollution 
• the external cost of accidents 
• road damage. 
It is also arguable that high community dependence on motor vehicles increases risks of social 
exclusion for many people, which suggests that there is also a social exclusion external cost of 
road use (Stanley et al., 2011a,b). 
Europe has had an active interest in externality costing of transport for four decades, with this 
interest increasing over the last two decades.  The important ExternE project to cost externalities 
started in 19915
A major report prepared for the (then) UK Department of the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions in 2001 suggested that road user charges covered total costs of road use on a fully 
allocated cost basis, if congestion costs are not included, but that the marginal costs of use 
(which include congestion costs) were two to three times the relevant marginal revenue levels 
(Sansom et al., 2001).  In terms of the requirements for efficient pricing, this suggested a need 
for some increases in charges for road use, particularly in peak periods, because of the high 
levels of congestion costs (even though UK fuel taxes were already far higher than those in 
Australia).  That report estimated total fully allocated road costs for Great Britain of 3.34-7.20 
pence/vehicle kilometre and marginal costs of 12.3-16.3p/vkm (Sansom et al., 2001, Table B, 
page v). 
, with external costs of road use being one of its major interests.  Maddison et al. 
(1996) brought together much of the international work at the time, with a UK focus.    
US interest in externality costing of road use also has a long history.  In recent years, Dr Ian 
Parry and colleagues at Resources for the Future have published extensively in this area, with 
their main focus being the US (see, for example, Parry and Small 2005; Parry 2008; Parry 2009; 
Safirova et al. 2007).  Parry’s work is notable because it examines external costs of transport 
within the broader context of the taxation system, seeking to optimise road user charges within 
this broader setting.  He draws on Ramsey’s (1927) insight that taxes for raising revenue should 
be higher on goods whose price elasticities are lower.  Parry’s work suggests a need for 
substantially increasing taxes on highway fuels in the US (where they are much lower than in 
Australia) and using the revenues to finance reductions in distortionary income taxes (Parry 
2009).  He acknowledges, however, that there is still room to sharpen estimates of some external 
costs and that his estimates of optimal fuel taxes should be treated with some caution. 
In terms of quantifying specific external costs in the US context, Parry (2009) produced the 
figures shown in Table 1.  These cost estimates are marginal costs, showing the expected 
change in the costs in question for a unit change in traffic levels.  The way the costs are cited 
suggests that marginal costs equal average costs. 
Table 1:  Marginal external costs  
External Costs Cost (Petrol Cars) (2007) 
Air pollution 
Accidents (external cost only) 
Climate change 
Oil dependency 
Congestion 
1c/mile 
3.5c/mile 
9c/gallon (at $10/t CO2) 
10c/gallon 
4.5c/mile 
Source: Parry (2009) 
                                                          
5 http://www.externe.info/ 
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The most comprehensive early Australian examination of external costs of road use was 
probably the Bus Industry Confederation’s submission to the 2001 Commonwealth Fuel Tax 
Inquiry, a submission whose preparation was assisted by ExternE project consultant, Paul 
Watkiss (BIC 2001), who was also a co-author of Sansom et al. (2001).  That submission 
estimated the total external costs of road transport in Australia at $30.5 billion (Table 2).  
Revenues collected by governments from road users were estimated at $11.5 billion, well below 
the total external costs.  The CRRP process (see section 1.3 above) is only concerned with less 
than $2 billion of such expenditure, this being the heavy vehicle part of road costs.  Stanley 
(2010) has updated the costs and revenues shown in Table 2 and estimated the total external 
costs of road use at over $40b, with revenues at $16 billion, suggesting a wider total deficit than 
a decade ago. 
The 2001 BIC research presented estimates of fuel-based charges that might be used to cover 
various external costs, with congestion costs excluded – on the argument that this should be 
charged on a city- specific basis, rather than being recovered through fuel charges.  BIC argued 
that its analysis (Table 3 below) showed that, in addition to road users as a whole not meeting 
the full external costs of their road use (as per Table 2) (BIC 2001, p. 76): 
• the current fuel excise (~38c/L) is probably about right as a charge for internalising the 
costs of urban road use by cars, ignoring congestion costs, but is too high in relation to 
rural road use by cars; 
• the external costs of urban road use by heavy vehicles are probably higher than the 
current excise rate (ignoring congestion costs) but rural external costs for these vehicles 
are probably similar to current excise rates. 
An implication of this analysis was that heavy vehicles should not receive any rebates of the 
fuel excise, unless they could demonstrate they create external benefits (as can be shown for 
buses, which reduce external costs of road use). 
Table 2:  Total external costs of road transport and road-related revenues (2001) 
 
Cost/Revenue Item Total ($b) 
COSTS 
Road expenditure 
Congestion 
Air pollution 
Climate change 
Noise 
Accidents 
Total Costs 
 
REVENUES 
Commonwealth excise 
Less diesel fuel rebate 
Less DAFGS 
Registration fees  
Total Revenues 
 
ROAD “DEFICIT” 
 
4.6 
12.8 
4.3 
2.4 
1.2 
5 
30.3 
 
 
12 
-2 
-0.7 
2.2 
11.5 
 
~$20B. 
 
                                        Source: BIC (2001) 
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Table 3:  Proposed fuel based externality charges for a range of road transport vehicles  
(c/L; CNG = c/kg; 2001 prices) 
 
Cost Component Cars (petrol) Artic. Trucks Buses 
 Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban CNG 
Infrastructure 8 8 20 20 20 20 16 
Congestion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Air pollution 2-10 0 7-31 0 6-24 0 5-10 
Climate change 9 9 11 11 11 11 11 
Noise 7 0 7 7 7 0 7 
Accidents 8 8 4 4 4 4 4 
Totals 34-42 25 49-73 35 48-66 35 43-48 
Source: BIC (2001) 
Drawing on much of the BIC work, the Victorian Department of Transport subsequently 
produced external cost estimates for use in project evaluations and this work has now been 
broadened into Australian Transport Council evaluation guidelines6, which set out a 
comprehensive set of external costs and proposed values for use in project/program evaluation.  
Many other countries have done likewise, with the UK Webtag system7
More recently, oil dependence has been noted as a possible external cost of road use (Parry and 
Small 2005), as has obesity from high reliance on motor vehicle travel, with associated 
diminished physical exercise (Stanley and Barrett 2010).   
 and Dutch evaluation 
handbook notable (Maibach et al. 2007).  
Clarke and Prentice (2009), in their research paper for the Henry Tax Review (AFTS), discussed 
the external costs of road use in Australia, drawing particularly on the work of Parry and Small 
(2005).  We draw on some of the Clarke and Prentice analysis below. 
The main conclusions the current authors draw from this brief overview of research on the 
external costs of transport are that: 
• there is now a long history of quantifying the external costs of transport; 
• the focus of this quantification has been on the external costs of road use; 
• Australian road users do not meet the full social costs of their travel choices; 
• road damage costs tend to be dwarfed by other external costs of road use, which 
suggests that road use charging regimes should have a much broader focus than simply 
seeking to recover only road damage costs and, in Australia’s case, explicitly only 
heavy vehicle road damage costs; 
• the gap between the total external costs (and marginal costs) of road use in Australia, 
and current road user charges, is increasing, suggesting that there is increasing urgency 
for reform of road pricing; 
• the growing international literature on the externalities of road use, and increasing 
implementation of congestion pricing schemes, suggests that there is likely to be a 
growing incidence of such initiatives in the coming decade.  
  
                                                          
6 http://www.atcouncil.gov.au/documents/files/National_Guidelines_Volume_3.pdf 
7 http://www.dft.gov.uk/webtag/ 
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3. Changing how road use is priced 
3.1 Congestion pricing 
The discussion on the size of external costs ceased to be an abstract intellectual exercise for 
economists when a number of countries actually implemented explicit road pricing regimes 
which recognised that externalities are important price setting inclusions for improving resource 
allocation efficiency.  The major externality that has been recognised in terms of transport 
pricing regimes is congestion, where cities such as Singapore, London, Stockholm and several 
Norwegian cities have implemented schemes (area or cordon-based charging), places such as 
Oregon have had trials and the Dutch have gone close to implementing a comprehensive GPS-
based pricing scheme.    
Professor Tony May from Leeds University has reviewed congestion pricing schemes, Box 1 
summarising his main findings.   The evidence is compelling that there is no other initiative that 
can reduce road traffic levels so much, so quickly and in such a sustained manner.  UK research 
suggests that reductions in road traffic levels of 4% can cut congestion costs by about 40% (DfT 
2004, Table B).  A pricing solution helps to ensure that traffic reductions do not attract 
additional traffic levels back to fill the void, such that congestion cost savings (benefits) can 
actually be realised from congestion pricing solutions. In Section 3.2 below, we present some 
specific impact measures for particular schemes. 
 
Pricing reform in land transport is also a current concern in the US, where infrastructure 
backlogs and associated funding flows have been the subject of a major recent review.  The US 
National Surface Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission report, Paying Our Way, 
proposes shifting from the current US road funding system, based largely on indirect user fees 
in the form of federal motor taxes, toward a new system built around more direct user charges, 
in the form of fees for miles driven (NSTIFC 2009).  The Commission points out that the 
current US transport system is underpriced and that a vehicle mile travelled (VMT) charging 
system is the consensus choice for the future.  It proposes that the federal government commit to 
deploying such a system by 2020, this timeline recognising the difficulties in implementation.  
Funding shortfalls in the US Highway Trust Fund provide a sharp edge to the consideration of 
this matter in the US.   
 
Box 1: Impacts of Congestion Pricing Schemes 
Traffic reduction 
- 14-23% from schemes intended to reduce congestion (e.g. London, Stockholm), 
often growing over time  
- Less from schemes with lower charges, where revenue raising was the main purpose 
Impact on travel speeds 
- Relatively bigger than traffic reduction 
Impact on local business in charge area 
- Minimal 
Impact on emissions 
- Favourable but usually relatively less than congestion impact 
Impact on public acceptance 
- Usually weak before implementation then majority support 
 
Source: Based on May (2010) 
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The Commission set out six guiding principles for its deliberations (NSTIFC 2009, pp 26-7): 
1. The funding and finance framework must support the overall goal of enhancing 
mobility of all users of the transportation system; 
2. The funding and financing framework must generate sufficient funding to meet 
national investment needs on a sustainable basis...; 
3. The funding and financing framework should cause users and direct beneficiaries 
to bear the full cost of using the transportation system to the greatest extent 
possible... This will not be possible in all instances, and when it is not, any cross-
subsidisation must be intentional, fully transparent, and designed to meet network 
goals, equity goals, or other compelling purposes; 
4. The funding and financing framework should encourage investment in the 
transportation system... 
5. The funding and financing framework should incorporate equity considerations – 
for example, generational equity, equity across income groups, and geographic 
equity; 
6. The funding and financing framework should support the broad public policy 
objectives of energy independence and environmental protection. 
These guidelines are useful for any Australian consideration of land transport pricing reform.   
Importantly, the Commission found that future US transportation infrastructure financing 
requirements could be substantially reduced if a congestion charging scheme was in place.  The 
investment needed to maintain existing land transport system performance was estimated at 
26% less under a congestion pricing regime.  Also, a congestion pricing regime was estimated 
to reduce future highway improvement costs by 28% but increase public transport investment 
needs by 28%, with a net reduction of 15% in land transport infrastructure improvement outlays 
overall (NSTIFC 2009, p. 57). 
3.2 Some case studies 
Li and Hensher (2010) have also reviewed the evidence about congestion charging schemes. 
Table 4 summarises the real impacts after the first year of permanent implementation of four 
charging schemes8
A common experience with implementation of congestion charging schemes, in particular, is 
minority popular support at time of implementation but subsequent majority support.  The 
Stockholm experience illustrates this phenomenon.  Borjesson et al. (2010) report that only 36% 
supported the Stockholm trial scheme, as it then was, prior to commencement.  Support 
increased to 52% once the trial started.  At the subsequent referendum on whether the scheme 
should continue, 53% voted yes.  By 2009, support had increased to about three in four people.  
Reasons for this increasing support, suggested by Borjesson et al. (2010) are: 
.  From the few monitoring studies, evidence shows that the various schemes 
resulted in significant reductions in traffic during charging hours (over 14 percent), faster speeds 
(e.g., 14 km/h to 18 km/h for London), and increased public transport mode share (from a 6.2 
percent increase for Milan to 21 percent for Singapore).  The 70% Singapore reduction in cars 
entering the charging zone during charge hours is striking but well beyond what might need to 
be contemplated for Australia’s major cities!  
• benefits exceeding expectations; 
• costs falling short of expectations; 
• people accepting what was seen as unavoidable; 
• greater familiarity with the scheme. 
 
                                                          
8 Although the primary purpose of Milan’s scheme is pollution abatement, it has substantially reduced congestion.  
Environmental and social taxes:  Reforming road pricing in Australia 
Stanley & Hensher 
 
8 
London’s experience in terms of support for congestion charging pre and post implementation 
also reflects increasing support over time, supporting the arguments for a political approach that 
involves showing leadership.  
Table 4:  Real impacts of congestion pricing schemes 
 
 
 Congestion charging schemes  
Impacts of the projects  London Stockholm Milan Singapore 
Reduction in traffic 
(vehicles with four or more 
wheels) entering the zone 
during charging hours  
18% 
trial: 22%, 
after permanent 
implementation:18% 
14.2% (23% during the 
morning peak hours) 
40-45% (Area Licensing Scheme), 
15% (Electronic road pricing) 
Reduction in cars entering 
the zone during charging 
hours  
33% Not available Not available 70% 
Change in traffic beyond 
charging hours  
Observed peak traffic 
after the charging 
hours in the first year, 
normalized in the 
coming years. 
Observed peak traffic after 
the charging hours in the 
first year, normalized in 
the coming years. 
Observed peak traffic 
after the charging hours +23% 
Change in traffic round the 
charging zone  -5% +10% -3.6% Not available 
Change in traffic in the 
inner road  +4% +5% Not available Not available 
Increase in speed inside the 
charging area  
30% (from 14 km/h to 
18km/h) 
30-50% (33% in the 
morning peak hours) 4% 20% 
Change in speed in the 
inner road  Not available Not available Not available -20% 
Increase in bus speed inside 
the charging area  6% Not available 
7.8% attributed to 
charging zone in 
combination with bus 
lanes. 
 
 
Not available 
Increase in the use of public 
transport  
above 7% totally, 37% 
in bus passengers 
entering the zone 
9% 6.2% totally, 9.2% in metro passengers 21% 
4. Getting the prices right 
4.1 Clarke and Prentice (2009) 
As noted in Section 1.4, Clarke and Prentice (2009) adapted the Parry and Small (2005) model 
to estimate optimal fuel charges for Australia.  As they explain, the Parry and Small model 
derives an optimal tax which both internalises a range of external costs of road use (local 
pollution, greenhouse gas emissions, energy security, accidents, congestion) and incorporates 
the efficiency trade-off between commodity taxation and income taxation, called the Ramsey 
component (such that the excess burden of different taxes can be included within a welfare 
optimising framework, along with external costs).9
The Clarke and Prentice adaptation of the Parry and Small research led them to conclude that 
the Australian excise on fuel should be considerably higher than the current rate.  As shown in 
Table 5, their estimates ranged between $0.83c/L and $3.28c/L, well above the excise rate of 
38.143c/L.  The major source of variability in their estimates is in the Ramsey component, 
which changes substantially as underlying modelling assumptions are varied (Table 5).  
However, as Clarke and Prentice (2009) note, all their estimates suggest that simply recovering 
the external costs of road use through the fuel excise would require an increase of about 10c/L 
on the current excise rate, the externality component of their optimal fuel tax being relatively 
stable at just under 50c/L. 
   
                                                          
9 For a detailed explanation of the model, its derivation and some applications, see Parry and Small (2005) and Parry (2009), 
while Clarke and Prentice (2009) present a summarised description of the model. 
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Table 5:  Clarke and Prentice fuel charge estimates for Australia 
Basis of calculation Externality 
Component 
Ramsey 
Component 
Optimal Tax 
Australian estimate 
Australian estimate – high elasticity of 
demand 
Australian estimate – low share of 
government 
Australian estimate – higher labour supply 
elasticity 
$0.48 
$0.47 
 
$0.49 
 
$0.46 
$1.51 
$0.36 
 
$0.51 
 
$2.82 
$1.99 
$0.83 
 
$1.00 
 
$3.28 
Source: Clarke and Prentice (2009) Table 6. 
4.2 Stanley and Hensher estimates 
4.2.1 Base estimate 
Dr Ian Parry kindly made his optimal fuel tax models available to the current authors, for the 
purposes of this research paper.  To apply the model, we have adopted the assumptions set out 
in Table 6, in most cases aligning with assumptions adopted by Clarke and Prentice (2009) 
(who, in turn, frequently adopt the Parry and Small (2005) assumptions).  The Parry model uses 
gallons and miles, rather than litres and kilometres, but our results in Table 7 are expressed in 
terms of a cents/litre optimal fuel charge.  Road damage costs are not included, on the basis that 
marginal road damage costs relate primarily to heavy vehicle use and should be recovered from 
heavy vehicles. 
Our base optimal fuel (petrol) tax is $0.94/L (Table 7).10
Table 6:  Parameter assumptions used for base application of Parry model to Australia 
  The externality cost component is 
44c/L, quite similar to the estimates produced by Clarke and Prentice and again suggesting that 
the Australian fuel excise is not sufficient to cover the external costs of road use.  The Ramsey 
tax component in the base estimate is $0.50c/L, similar to the Clarke and Prentice “low share of 
government” estimate, mainly because our base model run uses the 35% government spending 
share that Clarke and Prentice use as a sensitivity test for their low government spending share 
scenario.  In our base case, revenues to government from the fuel tax are more than double 
existing revenues but they increase relatively less than the increase in the fuel excise (or tax) 
rate, because higher fuel prices drive fuel economies. 
Parameter Base Value 
Used 
Comments 
Initial car fuel efficiency (miles/gallon) 
Pollution damage - distance-related (c/ml) 
Pollution damage - fuel-related (c/gal) 
 
External congestion costs (c/ml) 
External accident costs (c/ml) 
Fuel price elasticity 
VMT portion of fuel price elasticity 
VMT expenditure elasticity 
Uncompensated labour supply elasticity 
Compensated labour supply elasticity 
Government spending/GDP 
Fuel production share 
Producer price of fuel (c/gal) 
Initial tax rate on fuel (c/gal) 
21.5 
2.4 
32 
 
10.9 
3.5 
-0.21 
0.4 
0.6 
0.2 
0.35 
0.35 
0.0156 
227 
144.4 
 
Authors’ estimate 
Clarke and Prentice (2009) 
Assumes carbon at $25/t; energy security 
10c/gal, as per Parry and Small (2005) 
Clarke and Prentice (2009) on a mile basis 
Parry (2009) 
Parry and Small (2005) 
Clarke and Prentice (2009) 
Parry and Small (2005) 
Parry and Small (2005) 
Parry and Small (2005) 
Clarke and Prentice (2009) low estimate 
Clarke and Prentice (2009) 
Clarke and Prentice (2009) on gallon basis 
Clarke and Prentice (2009) on gallon basis 
                                                          
10 Ideally, separate calculations would be done for petrol and diesel, covering (broadly) cars and heavy vehicles separately.  That 
is a matter for more detailed analysis, rather than this indicative piece of research. 
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Table 7:  Stanley and Hensher fuel charge estimates for Australia  
Basis of calculation Externality 
Component 
Ramsey 
Component 
Optimal Tax Revenue/Base 
Base estimate 
Accident costs increased (higher 
value of life) 
No congestion costs 
$0.44 
$0.57 
 
$0.39 
$0.50 
$0.55 
 
$0.48 
$0.94 
$1.13 
 
$0.87 
2.27 
2.64 
 
2.11 
 
4.2.2 Some sensitivity tests 
Estimating the external part of accident costs is a difficult and under-researched area and the 
AFTS analysis (Henry Tax Review) did not include accident externalities in its discussion of 
road pricing reform.  There are two major issues in the Australian context: first, estimating 
accident costs; and second, estimating the external part of these costs.   
BITRE (2009a) estimated Australian road crash costs at $17.85 billion in 2006.  That report 
used a hybrid human capital approach to valuing life.  It is arguable that a willingness-to-pay 
value for life is more consistent with other values used in transport cost-benefit studies.   If the 
Hensher et al. (2009) value of $6.2 million for life is used, which is now included in the NSW 
RTA economic evaluation manual,  BITRE (2009a) estimates that total accident costs would 
increase to $27.12 billion.   
BIC (2001) cites work that suggests that 20-35% of accident costs might be external, in the 
sense that they are not covered by private insurances.  We use the low end of this range (20%) 
and apply it to the BITRE base accident cost estimate of $17.85 billion to get an estimate of 
$3.6 billion for the external costs of accidents.  If the total cost of accidents increases by $9.27 
billion when a willingness-to-pay value for life is used, the full amount of this increase in total 
accident costs can be added to the base estimate of accident externalities to re-estimate accident 
externalities.  This gives a value of $12.9 billion.  Spread over 224b vkms11
Given our strong belief that a willingness-to-pay approach is the most suitable way to assess the 
welfare impacts of most public policy, this sensitivity test case is the modelling run on which 
we would place most weight in terms of optimal fuel charging. 
, this suggests 
accident externalities of about 5.8c/km or 9.2c/ml (in 2006).  This is used as a sensitivity test in 
Table 7, increasing the optimal fuel tax by 19c/L, with the externality component of the tax 
increasing by 13c/L to 57c/L.  Revenues are an estimated 2.64 times current fuel tax revenues 
under this scenario.   
It might be argued that congestion costs should only be levied in some locations, rather than 
recovered through broader charges.  If congestion costs are removed from our base case, Table 
7 shows that the optimal fuel tax falls from $0.94/L to $0.87/L, with the externality component 
(39c/L) being almost exactly equal to the current excise rate.   This sensitivity test provides a 
rough basis for identifying which particular external costs of Australian road use might be 
reasonably considered as being internalised, on average, through the current excise system.  In 
making this point, it needs to be recalled that there are no road damage costs in the analysis 
reported in Table 7, since marginal road damage costs of light vehicles are negligible and, in a 
reformed marginal social cost-based road pricing regime, would be primarily recovered from 
heavy vehicles. 
4.2.3 A vehicle kilometre charge 
Parry and Small (2005) demonstrate that economic welfare gains are actually higher with a 
vehicle mile tax (VMT) than with optimal fuel charging, presumably because external costs are 
more closely driven by distance than by fuel use but also because the elasticity of VMT with 
respect to fuel cost is quite small, making VMT a more attractive target than fuel for a Ramsey 
                                                          
11 BITRE (2009b) 
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type revenue raising tax.  The Parry and Small optimal VMT is close to what they describe as 
their “naive externality tax” at current fuel economy rates.  In our base run, the naive externality 
charge at starting fuel economy rates is $3.93 gallon, which converts to a charge of 11.4c/km.  
In our “Accident costs increased” sensitivity test, the charge increases to 15c/km.  In the “No 
congestion costs” case it falls to 4.6c/km, showing the significance of congestion costs within 
the total set of external costs that have been included in the analysis. 
4.2.4 Distributional consequences 
The equity impact of road pricing reform, and particularly of congestion charging, is a critical 
issue to be considered.  The notion of distributive justice (or equity) is also a complicated 
concept, which depends substantively on context and circumstance.  For example, Santos and 
Rojey (2004) showed that cordon congestion charging can be regressive, progressive, or neutral, 
depending on the residential and employment configuration, and modal choice distribution.  
McMullen et al. (2010), in a broader context than congestion charging, assess the distributional 
impacts of a switch from a fuel tax (24 cents per mile) to a vehicle miles travelled (VMT) tax 
(of a flat 1.2 cents per mile) for the state of Oregon, and conclude that the VMT tax is found to 
be only slightly more regressive than an already regressive fuel tax. A particularly interesting 
finding is that rural households would benefit from a change in tax regimes, primarily because 
of the fact that, on average, such households own vehicles that lower fuel efficiency even 
though they drive greater distances than urban households. 
5. Pathways 
As argued convincingly by SAHA (2010), the level and structure of road user charges that result 
from a reformed Australian road pricing regime will depend significantly on the approach taken 
by governments to what is included/excluded, in terms of external costs, and to decisions on 
cost-recovery targets.  International experience with congestion pricing suggests that, if policy 
makers are serious about implementation of some form of reform program, such decisions 
should be taken against the background of an open community conversation around questions 
such as: 
• why road pricing needs to change 
• the options for change 
• how these options will impact on various stakeholders 
• what will happen to revenue raised from the charges 
• what measures might be implemented to mitigate particular adverse impacts 
• how privacy will be protected if comprehensive mass, location, distance charging is 
adopted. 
Such conversation will need about two years and should be managed by eminent independent 
people, who are committed to the need for open dialogue. 
A first step towards implementation may involve changes in the way existing toll roads are 
priced, to incorporate a congestion premium.  This will obviously require consideration of 
existing contractual provisions and decisions about how any additional revenue that might result 
from such a scheme should be used.  Alternatively, it may be that off-peak prices are lowered 
and peak prices are raised, with a neutral impact on overall toll-road operator cash flow. 
A variant of this pricing option is development of a priced lane on existing toll roads, to 
guarantee a faster trip at congested times.  This gives users an option of paying a higher price 
for a faster trip.   
Our indicative calculations of externality costs suggest that user charges should increase by 5-
10c/L in the near term, which could perhaps be achieved by simply adding a carbon charge to 
the existing excise rate, even though this option has been ruled out politically.  The revenue 
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from such a charge should be hypothecated to improve land transport systems, including public 
transport.   
Long term, we see mass, distance, location charging as the ideal solution, because of the 
flexibility that it provides to vary charges for road use to reflect (for example): 
• road damage that relates to vehicle mass and dimensions 
• congestion that is location specific 
• air pollution and noise costs that are also location specific 
• the distance users travel, which will affect the quantum of their social costs. 
An important policy decision concerns the extent to which the charging structure seeks to 
increase the revenue raised from road users, to enable increased infrastructure spending.   
Public transport fare setting should be an integral part of the community conversation about 
road pricing reform.  The current failure to price the external costs of road use is a significant 
argument in favour of governmental funding support for public transport.  If road prices more 
closely reflect the relevant marginal social costs of the travel in question, the case for funding 
support to public transport reduces.  There will still remain strong social safety net arguments 
for some governmental funding support of public transport, even in a regime of marginal social 
costing of road use. 
6. Concluding comments 
A growing number of voices are calling for reform of the way road use is priced in Australia, 
primarily because the current pricing regime provides poor price signals for efficient use of 
scarce road capacity.  Australian road users currently do not pay enough for their road use, in 
aggregate, once the external costs of road use are recognised.  Peak road use should be more 
expensive.  Rural road use on high quality pavements should arguably be cheaper.  While much 
of the focus on reforming road pricing has been on better pricing congested road use, congestion 
is only one of a number of costs of road use that are inadequately recognised in charging for 
road use.  International experience suggests that implementation of major road pricing reform, 
particularly involving congestion charging, often starts with only minority support, requiring 
strong political leadership, but is replaced by majority support once schemes are in place.   
International experience also suggests that reforming road pricing is hard work and that an 
engaged community is a fundamental pre-requisite.  The COAG Road Pricing Reform for heavy 
vehicles has been a positive initiative.  However, heavy vehicle pricing has an established set of 
stakeholder relationships within which to engage and negotiate reform.  Extensive road pricing 
reform, involving light vehicles and additional costs for both heavy and light vehicles, is more 
complex and must be undertaken in a more open framework.   Reformed road pricing typically 
starts with minority support but this soon changes to majority support, a political context with 
which Australian politicians are familiar.  Instead of continued inter-governmental 
investigations into road pricing reform, it is time Australia launched an independent inquiry into 
road pricing reform, run by eminent persons reporting directly to COAG.  That inquiry needs a 
two-year time frame for a serious process of research and community engagement, which 
should provide the foundation for real reform, rather than simply more talk.   
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